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Economics

Liquidation Preference, Explained With a $15 Million Sale and a $100 Million One

The clause decides who gets paid first when the company is sold. One multiple and one word, “participating”, can move millions between investors and everyone else.

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Picture two founders who sell their companies for the same price on the same day. One walks away with a life-changing sum. The other gets almost nothing. The difference is often not the valuation they raised at, but a paragraph most of their employees never read: the liquidation preference.

What the clause does

A liquidation preference gives holders of preferred stock the right to be paid before holders of common stock when the company is sold, merged or wound down. Founders and employees almost always hold common stock. Investors almost always hold preferred. So the preference sets the order in the queue.

Three variables define it:

  1. The multiple. How many times the original investment the preferred gets back first. 1x is the common default in early-stage rounds.
  2. Participation. Whether the preferred, after getting its money back, also shares in what is left.
  3. Seniority. If there are several series of preferred, whether later investors get paid before earlier ones or alongside them.

The running example

A fund invests $5 million for 20 percent of a company (a $25 million post-money valuation). Everyone else, founders, employees and earlier holders, owns the other 80 percent as common. There is no debt. Let us look at two possible exits.

1x non-participating preference

The investor chooses whichever is better: take its $5 million back, or convert to common and take 20 percent of the sale price.

Exit priceInvestor’s choiceInvestor getsCommon gets
$15MTake the preference ($5M beats 20% × $15M = $3M)$5.0M$10.0M
$25MIndifferent ($5M either way)$5.0M$20.0M
$100MConvert (20% × $100M = $20M)$20.0M$80.0M

Notice the crossover point: the investor converts once the exit is above $25 million, which is exactly the post-money valuation. Below that, the preference acts as downside protection. Above it, everyone shares according to ownership. That is why many founders consider 1x non-participating a fair trade.

1x fully participating preference

Now the investor takes its $5 million first and then 20 percent of the rest.

Exit priceInvestor getsCommon getsCommon’s share of the exit
$15M$5M + 20% × $10M = $7.0M$8.0M53%
$100M$5M + 20% × $95M = $24.0M$76.0M76%

At every price, common holders receive less than their 80 percent ownership suggests. Participation is sometimes called a “double dip”, and in most early-stage US deals today it is resisted strongly by founders’ counsel.

Capped participation

A middle ground: participation stops once the investor has received a set multiple of its money, often 2x or 3x. With a 3x cap ($15 million) in our example, the investor participates until its total hits $15 million. That happens at an exit of $55 million. Between $55 million and $75 million the investor is stuck at the cap. Above $75 million, 20 percent of the exit is worth more than $15 million, so it converts to common.

Multiples above 1x

A 2x non-participating preference in a $15 million sale gives the investor $10 million and common $5 million. Higher multiples tend to appear in difficult fundraising markets, in late-stage rounds with aggressive valuations, or in rescue financings.

Stacking: when there is more than one series

By Series C, a company may have three or four layers of preferred. Two common structures:

  • Pari passu: all series share the preference pool in proportion to the amounts owed. If there is not enough to go round, everyone takes the same haircut.
  • Standard seniority: the newest series is paid in full first, then the next newest, and so on. Earlier investors and common wait.

Total preferences matter more than any one series. A company that has raised $80 million on 1x non-participating terms needs to sell for more than $80 million before common receives anything meaningful, regardless of what the last valuation was.

A high valuation with heavy preferences can leave founders worse off in a modest sale than a lower valuation with clean terms.

Questions to ask before you sign

  1. What is the multiple, and is it participating?
  2. If participating, is there a cap?
  3. How does this series rank against existing preferred?
  4. What is the total preference stack after this round?
  5. Are there accruing dividends that will be added to the preference?
  6. How is a “deemed liquidation event” defined? Most term sheets treat a merger or sale of substantially all assets as a liquidation for this purpose.

Try different numbers in the Deal Lab and watch where the crossover points move.

Sources and further reading

All figures calculated by Term Sheet editors for a single-series example without debt, fees or management carve-outs. Terminology follows the NVCA model term sheet and certificate of incorporation.

Before you signThis guide is general education, not legal advice. Market terms vary by country, stage and sector, and every deal is different. Have a qualified startup lawyer review any term sheet before you sign it.

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